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Pick, Mix or Match? A Discussion of Theories for 
Management Accounting Research 
Abstract 
Maleen Z. Gong* 
Michael S. C. Tsd 
This paper presents a review on applications of four types of theories for 
management accounting (MA) research (contingency theory, agency theory, 
sociological theories and psychological theories) and comments on prospects of 
combining multiple theories in future MA research. Based on a review of studies that 
adopted the four types of theories, the authors argue that multiple theories can be 
applied jointly in future research to enrich our understandings on MA practices from 
multiple perspectives. However, theories should maintain their distinctiveness in their 
applications. Blending multiple theories into a single all-purpose theory can be 
counterproductive due to loss of explanatory power. 
Keywords: management accounting, contingency theory, agency theory, sociological 
theory, institutional theory, psychological theory. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Management accounting (MA) is a collection of techniques that support different 
management functions with an overarching objective of enhancing organizational 
value (Chenhall 2007; Sprinkle and Williamson 2007). Unlike other branches of 
accounting practices, MA practices are driven by needs of management rather than 
those of external stakeholders. Adoption and uses of MA techniques are influenced by 
various organizational, behavioral, economical, and social factors. To understand how 
these factors influence MA practices, four types of theories, namely contingency 
theory, agency theories, sociological theories, and psychological theories are frequently 
applied in studies on MA practices. Applying different theories in MA research enable 
researchers to understand MA practices from different perspectives, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of different MA techniques, and to improve future MA practices. The 
purpose of this paper is to review applications of these theories in MA research and to 
comment on prospects of combining these theories in future MA research. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section 
examines the theoretical foundations of the four types of theories and discusses how 
each type of theories can be applied in MA research through review of studies that 
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adopt aforementioned theOlY. The third section presents a discussion on how multiple 
theories can be used in future MA research and a concluding remark is provided in the 
fourth section. 
II. THEORIES FOR MA RESEARCH 
Contingency Theory 
Traditional organizational theorists believed that an optimal organizational 
structure for all organizations could be identified (Fayol 1949; Taylor 1911; Weber 
1946). In practice, however, organizational structure varies significantly across 
organizations. Contemporaty organizational theorists argue that there is no single 
"best" organizational structure. Performance of an organization depends on the fit 
between its organizational structure and other contextual variables such as 
environment, strategy, technology, organizational structure, size, and culture (Chenhall 
2007). The best organizational structure for an organization is the one that constitute 
the best fit with contextual variables associated with that organization at a particular 
period. When there is change in one or more of these contextual variables, another 
type of organizational structure may constitute the best fit with the contextual 
variables and become the best organizational structure for the organization. On the 
other hand, adoption of a particular type of organizational structure in an organization 
may alter other contextual variables and eventually change the suitability of the 
organizational structure in question for the organization. Therefore, the search for 
contingency fit is a continuous, dynamic process (Chenhall and Chapman 2006). 
Theories on contingency fit between organizations and contextual variables are 
collectively known as contingency theory. 
Under Contingency theory, MA practices are considered as components of 
organizational structure. The adoption of contingency theory to understand MA 
practice is the process to investigate the fit between a particular MA practice and 
contextual variables associated with an organization. Traditional "hard" variables like 
external environment, technology, organizational structure and size (Otley 1980; 
Waterhouse and Tiessen 1978) had been investigated by accounting researchers upon 
their relationship with MA practices for more than 25 years. In the last two decades of 
the twentieth century, accounting researchers changed their focus to emerging "soft" 
variables such as culture (Harrison and McKinnon 1999) and strategy (Langfield-
Smith 2006). MA studies involving the six aforementioned key contingency variables 
are reviewed below. 
External environment is an influential factor that determines the suitability of MA 
practices for organizations. MA practices vary in their abilities in supporting 
organizations to work under different environments. Therefore, an important task for 
MA researchers is to identify relative effectiveness of MA practices in different 
environments. In prior contingency-based MA research, following aspects of external 
environment are investigated: uncertainty (Burns and Stalker 1961; Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967), turbulence, hostility, diversity and complexity (Khandwalla 1977). 
Taking the most widely researched aspect of external environment, uncertainty, as an 
example, Hirst (1983) examined the relationship between reliance on Accounting 
Performance Measures (APM) and level of uncertainty and argued that reliance on 
APM was inappropriate irrespective of the level of uncertainty. However, his 
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hypotheses were rejected when job-related tension was used as measure of 
appropriateness of reliance on APM. 
Technology is another major contingency variable that is frequently examined in 
contingency-based MA research. Changes in technologies employed by organizations 
often lead to changes in organizations' requirements on MA practices. For instance, 
organizations that that employ mass production technologies in their production 
processes require formal, mechanistic controls such as budgetary system to support 
management in routine daily operations (Chenhall 2007). In contrast, organizations 
that adopt complex unit technologies for production of non-standard products require 
flexible and organic controls such as social controls and personnel controls to 
encourage rapid employees' responses to different situations (Woodward 1965). With 
the introduction of contemporary management initiatives such as Just-in-time aIT) 
and Total Quality Management (TQM), organizations need effective means to 
measure the outcomes of their strategic initiatives. Management control systems that 
link strategy and operations like balanced scorecard suit their needs well. 
The fit between MA practices and other components of organizational structure 
is one of the key issues in contingency-based MA research. Organizational structure is 
defined as the way in which the organization is differentiated and integrated 
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). As an organization's size increases, the level of 
differentiation increases. Increases in differentiation of an organization eventually lead 
to difficulties in integrating and controlling differentiated organizational subunits 
(Ouchi 1977). Evaluation of contingency fits between MA practices and organizational 
structures should be considered in conjunction with other contingency variables such 
as external environment, technology and organizational strategy as they may have 
significant moderating effects on the fits (Chenhall 2007). Two types of changes in 
organizational structure that captured MA researchers' attentions are decentralization 
and team-based structure. Decentralized organizations form divisionalized structure 
based on products or markets rather than organizational functions. The structures of 
organizations become flatter as layers of middle management are trimmed down. 
Consequently, decision-making powers that are traditionally held by middle managers 
are delegated to lower level managers. Bruns and Waterhouse (1975) found that 
managers of decentralized organizations with sophisticated technologies tended to be 
more participate in budget planning and emphasize strongly on formal management 
control systems (e.g. administrative control), while managers of organizations with 
concentrated authority were more likely to use interpersonal control and considered 
budgets as being less flexible. 
In comparison, team-based organizations establish cross-functional, semi-
permanent teams to perform organizational functions. Implementing team-based 
structure in organizations require accumulation of costs to individual teams. 
Therefore, traditional methods of accumulating accounting data may not be suitable to 
organizations with team-based structure. Research on roles of MA practices in 
organizations with team-based structures was very limited (Chenhall 2007). One of a 
few studies in this area, Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (2003) found that mechanic 
controls were incompatible with team-based structure as the former discouraged 
development of personal trust. 
Similar to technology, organizational size is a contingency variable which 
organizations can exercise high level of control. As a derived variable, organizational 
size can be measured via measures of organizational resources (number of employees, 
total assets) and/or measures of organizational outputs (number of customers, sales 
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revenue). It is suggested that the measure(s) of organization size used in research 
depends on contexts and dimensions of MA practices being studied (Chenhall 2007). 
Bruns and Waterhouse (1975) found that administrative controls predominate in 
larger organizations as they employed more sophisticated technologies, formalized and 
standard operating procedures, and more specialists. In contrast, interpersonal 
controls predominate in small organizations where centralized decision making and 
financial control systems based on simple or narrowly defined measures were found. 
Chenhall (2007) also proposed that "Large organizations are associated with an 
emphasis on and participation in budgets and sophisticated controls". 
Organizational strategy is a relatively new contingency variable in MA research. It 
is important for organizations as it can exert strong influences on other contingency 
variables. Implementing an organizational strategy requires managers to continuously 
assess the external environment, technologies, organizational structures and 
management control systems to achieve desired organizational goals (Chenhall 2007). 
The majority of contingency-based studies in this area focused on identifying the most 
suitable MA practices for a specific organizational strategy as MA practices were 
considered as tools for implementation of organizational strategy. However, Chenhall 
and Langfield -Smith (1998) found that the relationship between MA practices and 
organizational strategy might not be a straightfolward one-to-one relationship. They 
investigated the relationship between MA practices and two strategies, namely cost 
leadership and product differentiation. It was found that some MA techniques and 
practices like activity-based techniques and strategic planning techniques are beneficial 
to both strategies. Therefore higher performing firms that placed an emphasis on 
either strategy could gain high benefits by adopting these MA practices. 
Another major contemporary "soft" contingency variable is culture. Culture can 
be classified as national culture and organizational culture. With respect to national 
culture, the most widely used measure of national culture in MA research is 
Hofstede's four dimensions of culture (Hofstede 1984; Hofstede and Bond 1988). In 
Hofstede (1984), four dimensions of culture: power distance, individualism vs. 
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity vs. femininity are identified. A fifth 
dimension, Confucian dynamism, was introduced in his later work (Hofstede and 
Bond 1988) but applications of this dimension in MA research are relatively rare. 
National culture moderated the effects of MA practices in organizations as it 
influences the ways that managers and other employees respond to MA practices. 
Chenhall suggested that national culture should be considered in conjunction with 
other contingency variables such as technologies in MA systems design process as 
other variables may interact with national culture in systematic manner (Chenhall 
2007). 
While most of the contingency-based MA studies on culture focus on national 
culture, organizational culture also plays an important role in studies of culture (Martin 
1992). Organizational culture and national culture are interrelated: organizational 
culture derives its key features from the national culture. However, a strong 
organizational culture may supersede national culture in workplaces (Chenhall 2007). 
Therefore, both national culture and organizational culture should be considered in 
studies on MA practices in organizations. 
When we apply contingency theory to investigate relationship between a MA 
practice and a contingency variable, implications of other contingency variables on the 
relationship should also be taken into account. For instance, when we study the 
relationship between MA practices and organizational structure, we should consider 
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implications of strategy and technology on the relationship. Diversification strategy 
requires organizations to adopt divisional structure (Chenhall 1979; Shannon 1973) 
which require a more formal MA system. At the same time, change in organizational 
strategy may also force organizations to adopt new technology in their operations. In 
turn, deployment of new technology may lead to further changes in MA systems. 
Agency Theory 
The second type of theories that is frequently used in studies on MA practices is 
agency theory. Baiman (1990) defined an agency relationship as "one or more 
individuals (principal) hire others (agent) in order to delegate responsibilities to them". 
Agency theory assumes all individuals act in their own self-interests (Argryis 1973). An 
agency problem arises when principals' and agents' interests differ and agents choose 
to act in their own interests rather than principals' one. Agency theory is further 
developed into three models: principal-agent model, transaction cost economics 
model, and the Rochester model. All three models provide frameworks for analyzing 
principal-agent interactions, the causes for efficiency loss and the different control 
processes in mitigating efficiency loss. However, they adopt different assumptions to 
explain agents' behaviors and have different view on roles of incentive schemes. 
Most of the MA studies involving agency theory are based on principal-agent 
model. The three main assumptions on individual behaviors in principal-agent model 
are self-interest, rationality, and unlimited computational ability. Based on these 
assumptions, principal-agent model assumes that individuals can anticipate all possible 
future contingencies. Consequently employment contracts signed between principals 
and agents are comprehensive and complete. All possible actions to be taken by 
contracting parties are specified in contracts. Principal-agent model provides a 
framework within which roles of MA practices can be examined (Baiman 1990). 
Under principal-agent model, MA practices assist principals in design of contract and 
identification of optimal solution for employment relationship. Using information 
provided by MA systems, principals decide remuneration packages that align interests 
of principals and agents. In addition, principals can adopt appropriate performance 
management systems to keep self-serving agents' behavior into alignment with their 
interests. For example, Baiman and Noel (1985) examined the process of constructing 
performance evaluation and compensation measures and developed an analytic model 
under principal-agent framework to examine the reason of using information of non-
controllable costs for performance evaluation and compensation purposes. 
Despite its popularity, principal-agent agent model is subjected to a number of 
criticisms such as unrealistic assumption of unlimited computational ability, ignorance 
of the interaction between optimal contract and the capital markets as well as role of 
discretionary compensation in the model. In response to criticisms of the model, 
transaction cost economics model and the Rochester model are developed with more 
realistic assumptions. 
Similar to principal-agent model, transaction cost economics model also assumes 
individuals act in their self-interests. However, individuals are assumed to have limited 
computational ability. Limited computational ability limits individuals' ability in 
maximizing their utility and leads to out of pocket costs of decision-making and 
contracting (Baiman 1990). In this model, contracts are assumed to be incomplete as 
individuals do not incorporate all foreseeable contingencies into contracts due to 
contracting costs and/or inability to identify all contingencies. The incompleteness of 
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contracts gives contracting parties opporturuties to negotiate contingencies. For 
example, when un contracted contingencies arise, the earlier choice of MA practices 
(e.g. monitoring systems and budgeting systems) will affect the renegotiation process. 
This is because bargaining powers of contracting parties are affected by the 
distribution of information, which itself is affected by the earlier choice of MA 
practices. Therefore, principals would consider the need to renegotiate agreements 
with agents when choosing MA practices for their organizations and choose MA 
practices that enable them to gain a better bargaining position in the renegotiation 
process. The assumption of incomplete contract and allowance for renegotiation 
introduces a strategic element in choice of MA practices which is ignored in the 
principal-agent model (Baiman 1990). 
Both transaction cost economics model and the Rochester model emphasize 
transaction costs and opportunistic behavior. However, the latter places more 
emphasis on interactions between contracts, external labour and capital markets. The 
model assumes that observed contracts are optimal given the current level of 
transaction costs. The introduction of external labour and capital markets to the 
model has implications for the design of MA practices. For instance, organizations 
may choose to use coarse information to evaluate managers' performance and make 
promotion decisions even when finer information is available. The reason of not using 
available finer information is to avoid the use of same information by external labour 
market in revision of managers' wages. The external labour and capital markets 
influence the choice of MA systems and provide explanations for uses of sub-optimal 
MA practices in organizations (Baiman 1990). 
Sociological Theories 
Sociological theories focus on how institutions are established through 
interactions between human, organizations and society. In The Social Comtruction of 
Reality, Berger and Luckmann suggested that social order was fundamentally based on 
a shared social reality and defined institutionalization as the process that actions 
became repeated overtime and assigned similar meanings by all individuals. Covaleski 
et al. (1996) argued that an organization's survival required conformance to social 
norms of acceptable behavior in addition to achieving high levels of production 
efficiency. 
Sociological theorists consider MA systems as social practices rather than mere 
techniques for internal decision making and organizational efficiency. MA practices 
reflect power and politics of social construction. Once implemented, they determine 
what organizational members perceive as important. For instance, Wildavsky and 
Caiden (2003) argued that budgeting systems could be used for purposes other than 
control. Organizations with inherent conflicts may use budgets to establish and 
maintain current power relations and the political nature of budgeting is often 
observed in complex organizational life. Two specific perspectives from sociological 
theories can be adopted to enrich our understandings on MA practices: labour process 
perspective and the Foucaultian perspective. 
The labour process perspective has its roots in the works of Carl Marx which 
emphasizes class division in society, conflicts between wage labour and capitalists, and 
exploitation of labour and rebellion of the proletariats. From capitalists' point of view, 
labour should be minimized and optimized as, unlike other factors of production, it 
can rebel as well as generate profits. Due to the duality of its nature, capitalists must 
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gain control over labour as well as the labour process. Consequently there is an 
irreducible and unavoidable conflict between labour and capital which creates the 
capitalist social relations. From the labour process perspective, MA practices are not 
passive, value-neutral techniques for decision making but social practices which 
mirrors class, politics, status, and ideologies. The labour process perspective was 
adopted in a number of works such as Hopper and Armstrong (1991), Knights and 
Collinson (1987), and Oakes and Covaleski (1994). All of them argued that accounting 
and cost information were tools for capitalist exploitation. 
Foucault (1926-1984) employed another approach to study MA practices from a 
wider political and social context. He examined the emergence of MA practices from a 
historical perspective and argued that individuals could not be known and controlled 
before the late eighteenth century since the concept of "individual" had not been 
described. Accordingly individuals could not be made calculable and governable 
before the eighteenth century. From the Foucaultian perspective, MA practices are 
considered as the result of historical development through which people became 
governable. They are the disciplinary mechanisms that made "individual" visible and 
possible to be calculated and controlled. Foucault's historical view of MA practices 
can be used to explain certain aspects of the contemporary uses and innovations in 
MA practices. For instance, Preston (1992) studied the transformation of accounting 
in U.S. hospitals during late 1960s and 1970s by placing them in their social and 
historical contexts. The fIndings of the study revealed how changes in accounting 
thought and practices over the past 100 years were intertwined with changes in 
medical and hospital related knowledge and practices. Again, MA practices are 
considered as social practices rather than passive, value-neutral techniques. 
Another type of frequently used sociological theory is institutional theory. It 
explains the process of institutionalization by which rules, norms or routines became 
guidelines for social behavior (Scott 2004). As pointed out in Covaleski et al. (1996), 
conformance to social norms of acceptable behavior and high levels of production 
effIciency are of equal importance for an organization's survival. Institutional theory 
provides alternative explanations to why certain MA practices are adopted by 
organizations. Examples of these explanations include maintenance of power 
relationships within organizations, imitation of other organizations' "fashionable" 
systems, or responses to professional pressures such as laws and regulations (Chenhall 
2007). The use of institutional theory enables researchers to understand why some 
MA practices can survive in organizations even if they are not appropriate for these 
organizations. Apparently, power and political needs play an important role in 
construction of such a reality. 
Psychological Theories 
Human, as one of the most important components of organizations, play a 
critical role in the functioning of organizations. When individuals' behaviors are 
aligned with organizations' objectives, organizations prosper. To understand 
implications of individuals' behaviors on organizations, three branches of 
psychological theories, namely cognitive, motivation and social psychological theories 
are applied in MA research to study relationships between individuals' behavior and 
MA practices (Birnberg et al. 2007). 
Built upon the assumption of bounded rationality, cognitive psychological 
theories focus on individuals' cognitive processing of information. In decision making 
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processes, individuals are often overwhelmed by complexities of decision problems 
due to limited cognitive processing capabilities. Consequently, individuals use 
heuristics in their decision making processes (Birnberg et al. 2007; Goodwin and 
Wright 1998). When heuristics are used, individuals' decision performance is jointly 
determined by their probabilistic judgments and ways that heuristics are used. MA 
practices play an influential role on individuals' probabilistic judgements and uses of 
heuristics through providing different types of information. Booker et al. (2007) 
examined the relationship between cost information precision and new product 
development performance and found that provision of specific cost information 
increased new product developers' focus on cost reduction. Consequently, they 
produced more cost-effective designs without compromising on product features. 
Motivation theories focus on changes in individuals' motivation levels caused by 
stimuli. Individuals are motivated to take actions to maximize their pleasure and/or to 
avoid a state of internal disequilibrium (Birnberg et al. 2007; Locke and Latham 2002). 
Individuals maximize their pleasure through achieving the targeted outcomes. By 
providing information on expected and actual outcomes of individuals' actions, MA 
practices influence individuals' assessment of their achievements and change their 
motivation levels (Akter, Lee and Monden 1999; Drake, Haka and Ravenscroft 1999). 
For instance, Snead et al. (2005) found positive association between individuals' 
expectations on probabilities and attractiveness of possible outcomes from uses of 
activity-based cost information and their willingness to use the information. 
In addition, individuals are also motivated by desire to avoid internal 
disequilibrium. Individuals may experience internal disequilibrium if there are 
inconsistencies between cognitions (Harrison and Killough 2006; Jermias 2001). If 
individuals commit themselves to a particular MA practice and the practice is 
eventually abandoned, they experience cognitive inconsistencies. To overcome the 
cognitive inconsistencies, they increase their positive cognitions about the rejected 
practice and/or decrease their negative cognitions about the accepted practice 
(Birnberg et al. 2007; J ermias 2001). Harrison and Killough (2006) and J ermias (2001) 
studied the reasons of individuals' resistance to uses of activity-based cost information 
and found positive association between individuals' prior commitments to traditional 
volume-based cost management system and resistance to uses of activity-based cost 
information. 
Social psychological theories differ from the other two branches of psychological 
theories by looking at how individuals influence each others' behavior. Individuals 
classify their social world into in-groups and out-groups and are willing to make 
additional contributions to in-groups (Birnberg et al. 2007; Porter et al. 1974). MA 
practices can change individuals' motivation levels by influencing their classifications 
of social groups. For instance, adopting participative budgeting in an organization 
gives individuals a feeling of being part of an in-group of the organization and 
increases their commitments to budgetary goals (Brownell 1982; Nouri and Parker 
1998). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The four types of theories discussed above can be applied to enrich our 
understanding on MA practices in different ways. Contingency theory is a functionalist 
approach that focuses on fits between MA practices and certain levels of contingency 
variables. Adopting contingency theoty in MA research allows researchers to identify 
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combinations of MA practices and contingency variables that achieve highest level of 
performance (Donaldson 2001). A criticism of contingency theory is its inability to 
provide insights on reasons of adopting sub-optimal MA practices in organizations. 
To address this type of research questions, sociological theories can be used instead. 
Sociological theories focus on the effects of social norms of acceptable behavior, 
power and politics on adoptions of MA practices. It provides explanations on why 
organizations adopt certain MA practices, especially when the MA practice in question 
does not constitute the best fit with the contingency variables of the organization. 
Due to their focuses on organizations, contingency theory and sociological 
theories provide little insights on how MA practices influence relationships between 
organizations and individuals. For this type of research questions, application of 
agency theory or psychological theories is more appropriate. Both theories involve 
evaluation of MA practices from human perspective. Agency theory assumes that 
individuals are self-serving and will take opportunistic behavior (to a certain degree 
due to bounded rationality) to maximize their interests when opportunities arise. 
Agents will sacrifice organizations' interests if there is a divergence in between their 
interest and organizations' interests. Hence organizations apply certain MA practices 
like performance-based compensation schemes to align individuals' interests with 
organizations' interests. Psychological theories examine relationships between MA 
practices adopted by organizations and individuals' responses to the practices. In 
aggregate, individuals' responses to MA practices influence organizations' overall 
performance. 
As each theory has a fundamentally different view on the nature of MA practices, 
some management accounting researchers advice against the combination of multiple 
theories in studies on MA practices. For instance, Kuhn (1970) concluded that 
differences in philosophical presumptions make it impossible to use assumptions of 
one theory to help understanding those of the other theory. However, Covaleski et al. 
(1996) examined contingency theory and institutional the01Y and claimed that there 
should be more than one kind of fundamental reality. Different theories should not be 
viewed as competing perspectives. Rather, they should be considered as different ways 
to understand roles of MA practices. Morgan (1980) presented similar view on 
applying different theories to address the same issue. He argued that different theories 
examined an issue from fundamentally different perspectives and therefore provided 
different insights into the nature of the issue. 
While many theorists believe in the necessity to apply different theories 
separately, some suggest that an integrating framework that combines multiple 
theories can prevent managers and students from confusion over the variety of 
theories used in MA research (Chenhall 2007). Donaldson (1995) reviewed five 
contemporary organizational theories, namely population-ecology, institutional, 
resource dependence, agency, and transaction cost economics, and developed an 
integrative framework that combines the contingency theory with components from 
other theories. 
Apart from working under an integrative framework, multiple theories can be 
applied in MA studies in other ways. One approach for applying multiple theories in 
MA research is enriching one theory with insights from other theories. Tiessen (1983) 
applied concepts from agency theory in contingency theory to analyze the relationship 
between employers and employees. He argued that a fit between specificity of 
employment contracts and certain contextual variables can be explained by 
contingency theory. Predictable environments and routine technologies fitted well 
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with highly specified contracts which outline all actions to be taken by contracting 
parties for each verifiable event, vice versa. 
Review of prior research shows that there is no consensus on whether multiple 
theories should be applied together in MA research. In our opinion, multiple theories 
can be applied jointly to investigate research questions but they should not be blended 
into a single all-purpose theory. Any attempt to blend multiple theories into one 
theory requires theorists to soften their stances and blur their theoretical assertions to 
a certain extent. Theories will be compromised in the process and lose their 
distinctiveness (Donaldson 1995). 
Theories can be applied as alternative ways to understand the same research 
question. For instance, contingency theory is often applied in studies on choices of 
MA practices in organizations. While good fit between a practice and contingency 
variables in question implies better performance, poor fit does not necessarily mean 
the practice are abandoned. In fact, many organizations adopt MA practices that do 
not constitute the best with their contingency variables. In such cases, we can apply 
institutional theory to study the choices of MA practices from the social perspective. 
Gupta et al. (1994) applied contingency theory and institutional theory to examine 
how professionals in institutionalized environment were coordinated and controlled as 
well as the mechanism that drives the choice of control and coordination mechanisms. 
The two theories were used to interpret control and coordination from different 
perspectives. Findings of the study showed positive relationships between 
institutionalized environment and (1) organizations' reliance on a bureaucratic mode 
of control, (2) task difficulty and team independence, and (3) organizations' reliance 
on personal and group modes of control to improve audit-team performance. 
Similarly, agency theory and psychological theories can be applied together in 
studies on design of MA practices to ensure that both control and motivational 
aspects of the practices are taken into account. Information asymmetry is a common 
assumption to all agency models (Baiman 1990). For instance, management may 
intentionally withhold information on the link between performance measurement 
system and employees' remuneration in order to maximize their bargaining power 
with employees. However, such a performance measurement system may have side 
effect on employees' motivation if employees are not aware of, or do not believe in 
the existence of the link between the performance measurement system and their 
remuneration. Therefore, in the performance measurement system design process, 
organizations should make sure that the system can achieve the desired level of 
control as well as provide enough motivation. A balance between control and 
motivation should be maintained to ensure optimal organizational performance. 
Even when the underlying assumptions of different theories are inconsistent or 
contradictive, there is still a possibility to use them jointly to evaluate the roles of MA 
practices. An example of contradictive assumptions is the two models of man for 
principal-agent model and principal-steward model. Principal-agent model assumes 
man is self-serving economic man and principal-steward model argues that man is 
self-actualizing man (Argryis 1973). The two apparently opposite models can be used 
jointly to explain the different roles of MA practices through the model proposed by 
Davis et al. (1997). Davis's model assumes that both principals and managers make 
choices on their relationship. If both principals and managers decide to establish a 
principal-agent relationship, then a pure economics relationship is established. They 
will view MA practices as a tool to help them negotiate their own interests to the 
maximum level. If both of them decide to establish a principal-steward relationship, 
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MA practices will be perceived as means of rewarding mutual tmst and commitment. 
If different choices are made by the two parties, a mismatch occurs. A mismatch will 
lead to dysfunctional behavior and lower the organizational performance. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In MA research, different theories can be applied to study MA practices from 
multiple perspectives. Each theOlY can provide insights into different MA problems 
that other theories cannot fully address. However, blending multiple theories into a 
"new" theoty is undesirable as distinctive features of each theory are likely to be 
compromised in the blending process and the resulting theory will lose its explanatory 
power. Therefore, researchers should not focus on developing all-purpose theory or 
one-size-fit-all integrative framework. Instead they should aclmowledge the existence 
of contradictions in organizations, society, and human nature and use different 
theories to portray the whole picture from social, psychological, functional, and 
agency perspectives. 
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